According to standard theory, the set of implementable efficient outcome functions is greatly reduced if the mechanism or contract can be renegotiated ex post. In some cases contracts can achieve nothing and so, for example, the holdup problem may be severe. This paper shows that if the mechanism is designed in such a way that sending a message involves a small cost then renegotiation essentially does not restrict the set of efficient implementable functions.
Introduction
In one interpretation of the mechanism design problem, the agents involved are designing a mechanism for themselves, rather than having it imposed on them by an outside planner -the mechanism may, for example, be a contract or a constitution. In that case they will presumably choose a mechanism which will deliver a Pareto-efficient outcome in equilibrium. Suppose, however, that play of the mechanism results in an out-of-equilibrium outcome and that this outcome is Pareto-inefficient. Then, unless they have been able somehow to commit to this mechanism, the agents can be expected to tear up the contract and negotiate a new, Pareto-efficient, outcome. In the two-agent case, this possibility of renegotiation limits the set of social choice rules which can be implemented, as shown by Maskin and Moore (1999) (see also Segal and Whinston (2002) and the survey in Maskin and Sjöström (2002) ). The problem is that it may be necessary to punish an agent for deviating from the equilibrium, and moreover to do so without simultaneously rewarding the other agent. In that case, the mechanism would have to have inefficient outcomes for some combinations of messages, which is impossible if renegotiation cannot be prevented.
The Maskin-Moore renegotiation paradigm has been influential in contract theory.
For example, a number of well-known papers (e.g., Che and Hausch (1999), Segal (1999) ) have shown in the context of buyer-seller models that, when ex post contract renegotiation cannot be prevented, there are plausible environments in which there is no contract which can improve on the null contract. These results in turn, it is argued, provide a foundation for the incomplete contracts paradigm.
In this paper, we show that in standard models the possibility of renegotiation will in fact not constrain the Pareto-efficient implementable set if the mechanism can be designed in such a way that there is a strictly positive cost of sending a message (this cost can be arbitrarily close to zero). In the standard mechanism design model the parties can costlessly send messages (e.g., report their type) to the outside enforcer. In practice, however, sending any message will incur a strictly positive cost, if only the cost of making a telephone call or the opportunity cost of the time taken to attend a hearing. We show that if this friction is introduced into the model, then ex post renegotiation ceases to be a problem. More precisely, we consider a model with two risk-neutral agents, quasi-linear utility and complete information (i.e., the model encompasses the standard models found in the incomplete contracts literature). The result is that, for any strictly positive message cost, any Paretoefficient, bounded social choice function which satisfies a weak preference-reversal condition can be strongly implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium despite the possibility of renegotiation.
The proof relies on a dynamic mechanism which has potentially many steps. Immediately before each action node in the mechanism, the players have an opportunity to renegotiate. If, at any decision node, the continuation equilibrium is inefficient (as it must be, for example, if the equilibrium action is to send a message) then the players will indeed renegotiate just before that node, and abandon the mechanism.
Nevertheless, if renegotiation were, counterfactually, not to take place then one party would choose to send a message, thereby incurring an irrecoverable cost. This is enough to ensure that joint punishment, and thereby implementation of the desired social choice function, are possible.
The reason that the framework of this paper delivers different results from those derived in the Maskin-Moore framework is that in the latter every possible play of the mechanism is ex ante efficient. Here, by contrast, once a message has been sent, some resources have been used up. Subsequent renegotiation ensures that the equilibrium continuation play (starting from the renegotiation phase) will be efficient but it cannot recover the sunk cost, so such an outcome will not be efficient ex ante.
The dominant model of mechanism design is elegant and tractable, but it is not the only possible model, and in certain circumstances it leaves out some important considerations. Clearly, it is a common feature of many real contracts that they include provision for dispute resolution processes which are time-consuming and, therefore, necessarily costly. The parties to such a contract will have preferences over the manner in which the mechanism plays out as well as over the final outcome and this makes a difference to the analysis, particularly, as we show, when renegotiation cannot be prevented.
A number of solutions have been proposed to the problem caused by ex post renegotiation. One solution (Maskin-Moore (1999) ) is to include a third party. The two main parties can then both be punished by imposition of a fine which is paid to the third party, who need not be informed about the state. Because this outcome is efficient from the point of all three agents, it would not be renegotiated. One argument against this kind of scheme (see Hart and Moore (1999) ) is that it would be vulnerable to collusion: for example one of the original two parties might collude with the third party and trigger the fine. On the other hand, Baliga and Sjöström (2008) have argued that if collusive agreements and the original three-party agreement are modelled in a symmetric manner, and if the original mechanism may specify secret messages and secret cash transfers, then, in buyer-seller models and in moral-hazardin-teams models, the first-best can be implemented in a collusion-free manner.
A second setting in which the possibility of renegotiation may not much constrain the set of implementable social choice rules is the case in which the two parties are risk-averse, as shown by Maskin and Moore (1999) (see also Maskin and Tirole (1999) ). Suppose that it is possible for the mechanism to specify random outcomes after certain messages and that it is not possible for the parties to renegotiate in between the time that the messages are sent and the random variable is realized.
Then, even though, for each possible realization of the lottery, renegotiation will take place to the efficient frontier, the ex ante payoffs can be inefficient because of the nonlinearity of the frontier. It is a matter of debate (see Hart and Moore (1999) ) how practicable this scheme is -for example, whether it is possible to prevent renegotiation before the randomization.
The results of this paper shows that even if the above solutions are not feasible, for whatever reason, then, in a slightly perturbed version of the standard model, renegotiation still need not be an obstacle to efficient contracting. Section 2 below sets out the model. Section 3 has the main implementation result outlined above. Sections 4 and 5 discuss two extensions. Section 4 considers stronger renegotiation-proofness concepts in which the equilibrium is required to be proof not merely against a specific renegotiation procedure, but against any renegotiation procedure: results analogous to those of Section 3 apply. Section 5 defines similar concepts for the incomplete information case and establishes that any ex post efficient and interim incentive-compatible social choice rule is renegotiation-proof.
Related Literature
The result described here is related to the work of Watson (2004 Watson ( , 2007 , which demonstrates that mechanism design theory needs to take account of the interaction between renegotiation opportunities and the technology of trade. Watson distinguishes between public-action models and individual-action models. A public action is one taken by the external enforcement authority, while an individual action is an inalienable decision of one of the contracting parties. The standard theory of mechanism design treats actions as public (alternatively, actions are individual but the analysis is limited to forcing contracts). Watson shows that in an interim renegotiation setting (i.e., one in which renegotiation takes place only before the messages are sent) public-action and individual-action models are equivalent. However, in an ex post renegotiation setting more functions can be implemented in an individual-action model. Therefore, given the possibility of ex post renegotiation, explicit modeling of the technology of trade is necessary. Sending a message is necessarily an individual action; if doing so is costly then, in an ex post renegotiation setting, one would expect that explicit modeling of these costs is necessary. The result derived in this paper is that, if these costs are modeled, then the interim and ex post renegotiation settings turn out to be equivalent in the standard complete information model. Another paper which is close to the present one is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992) , which shows that if a time dimension is added to an implementation problem and renegotiation is modeled as costly because it involves delay then the set of implementable outcomes is expanded, compared with those of the standard model of implementation with renegotiation. There are a number of differences from the current paper. game with discounting and the renegotiation-proofness criterion is that at no stage should the players both be able to benefit by substituting a different outcome one period in the future. This seems to require significant ability of the outside enforcer to structure the negotiations. The approach of the current paper is that the bargaining game is exogenous and the mechanism has to be designed taking this given game into account. Furthermore, renegotiation is costless.
A number of papers examine models of mechanism design in which agents have different costs of sending different kinds of messages, for example because evidence has to be produced, or because there is a psychic cost of lying. Examples are Green and Laffont (1986) , Lipman and Seppi (1995) , Bull and Watson (2004) , Bull and Watson (2007) and Deneckere and Severinov (2003) . The message costs in the current paper are different because they do not depend on the type of the sender.
The Model
There are two agents, 1 and 2, both risk-neutral. The environment is D, Θ , where D is the set of outcomes and Θ is the set of states of the world. A feasible outcome consists of a physical outcome (or action) in a set A together with a pair of money transfers (y 1 , y 2 ) with non-positive sum. That is,
We discuss below the case in which the set of actions depends on the state, but for the moment A is assumed to be the same in all states. Each agent has a payoff function which depends on the state and is quasi-linear in money: if the action is a ∈ A, the state is θ ∈ Θ, and agent i's (i ∈ {1, 2}) money payment is y i ∈ then i's payoff is u i (a, θ) + y i . We assume that u i is bounded: there exists a number M 1 such that, for i ∈ {1, 2} and all (a, θ) ∈ A × Θ, |u i (a, θ)| < M 1 . The assumptions of risk-neutrality and quasi-linearity are made partly for expositional reasons and partly because these are the standard assumptions in the incomplete contracts literature. The result does not depend on them.
is the socially-optimal (or f -optimal) outcome when the state is θ. For simplicity, we assume that in each state θ ∈ Θ there is a unique Pareto-efficient action a * (θ). That is, a * (θ) is the unique solution to the problem
The maximized value of this problem is denoted by σ(θ).
A social choice function f is Pareto-efficient (or ex post efficient) if and only if for
It is bounded if and only if there exists M 2 such that, for i ∈ {1, 2} and all θ ∈ Θ, |y
Once the state of the world is realized, this true state is common knowledge among the agents (i.e., there is complete information). The agents then play a mechanism.
We consider extensive-form mechanisms: thus, a mechanism is a finite extensive gameform. Since we are interested in implementation with renegotiation, we will consider mechanisms which consist of an underlying mechanism together with renegotiation moves. At each decision node in the underlying mechanism, an agent chooses a message from some specified set of messages, or else sends no message, and each terminal node corresponds to an outcome in D, this outcome being common knowledge. If, given the true state θ, this outcome is inefficient, then we assume that before it is enforced the players have time to renegotiate to an efficient outcome. We make the assumption, common in the incomplete contracts literature, that the surplus from renegotiation is split equally, so if the outcome of the mechanism is (a, y 1 , y 2 ) and the state is θ then the players agree to enforce the outcome (a * (θ), y, −y) where y is chosen so that player i's utility for this outcome is
That is,
To this point the framework is the same as that of Maskin and Moore (1999) , for the case of quasi-linear payoff functions and the specific renegotiation rule just given. We now introduce two modifications to their framework. The first, which is minor, is that we assume that renegotiation can take place not only at the end of the mechanism, but also during the play of the mechanism. Since the mechanism may have many stages it is natural to suppose that if the players at any stage expect the continuation play to be inefficient then they will immediately renegotiate to an efficient outcome. To model this, we assume that immediately after every decision node of the underlying mechanism, except for final decision nodes, easy to see that if, at some message stage, there is a unique SPE continuation, and this is inefficient, then renegotiation will take place at the preceding bargaining stage, with the continuation payoffs acting as disagreement payoffs, and the renegotiation surplus will be equally shared. We also assume that there is a renegotiation phase immediately before the mechanism is played (after the players learn θ)
The second modification is that we assume that it costs a strictly positive amount k to send a message, where k may be arbitrarily small.
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This cost enters the sender's payoff function in the same way as a deduction of k units of money. We assume that the players do not discount the future, so it makes no difference whether the cost is deducted at the time the message is sent or at the end of the game. Our convention is that it is deducted at the time at which the message is sent: thus, when we refer below to a 'continuation payoff', this is to be understood as excluding all message costs (and transfer payments) incurred in the history to date. There is assumed to be no cost of renegotiating the mechanism. Since it is the possibility of renegotiation which limits what can be achieved, it strengthens the result of this paper if renegotiation is assumed to be as easy as possible.
We refer to a mechanism with renegotiation as described above and with message cost k as a k-mechanism.
Definition A social choice function f is renegotiation-proof-implementable in subgame-perfect equilibrium with message costs if, for any k > 0, there exists a kmechanism such that, for each θ ∈ Θ, there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the mechanism and the outcome of every SPE is f (θ).
Player 1 prefers (a, y, −y) to (a , y , −y ) in state θ if
It follows that it is possible to find (y, y ) such that 1 prefers (a, y, −y) to (a , y , −y ) in state θ and vice versa in state θ , i.e., preference reversal holds allowing for rene-
Therefore we will need to make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 is fairly weak and indeed is automatically satisfied in the buyerseller models found in the incomplete contracts literature. To see this, consider the following model.
Example: Buyer-Seller Model Player 1 is a seller (S) and player 2 is a buyer (B),
who will produce and trade at most one unit of some indivisible good. The set of goods which may potentially be produced is G; S will produce at most one of these.
The set of states of the world Θ = V × C where V and C are sets of real-valued
cost of producing g. The set of actions A = {G × {1, 0}} ∪ ∅, where (g, 1) means that S produces g ∈ G and transfers it to B, (g, 0) means that S produces g but does not transfer it to B, and ∅ means that no good is produced. If θ = (v, c) then
If we take a = (g, 0) and (1) is satisfied in each case.
The Main Implementation Result
In the framework set out above, but without message costs, the set of efficient implementable outcome functions would be severely restricted, as shown, for example, by Maskin and Moore (1999) , Segal (1999) , Che and Hausch (1999) and Segal and Whinston (2002) . But, as the following result shows, matters are different if message costs are positive.
Theorem 1: Any bounded, Pareto-efficient social choice function which satisfies Assumption 1 is renegotiation-proof-implementable in subgame-perfect equilibrium with message costs.
We provide here an outline of the proof, the remaining details being in the Appendix. Take an SCF f which satisfies the conditions of the Theorem. Let M 2 be an upper bound on |y f i (θ)|. For each ordered pair (θ, θ ) let a(θ, θ ) and a (θ, θ ) be actions satisfying (1) in Assumption 1. Let K be a number satisfying
, let T be an integer satisfying
and, finally, let
(Where the pair (θ, θ ) under consideration is clear, we will drop the arguments and refer to a, a and y.)
The following describes the underlying mechanism which will implement f (underlying because the renegotiation stages are omitted in the description).
1. Player 1 announces a state θ ∈ Θ.
2. Player 2 either (a) sends no message, in which case the mechanism ends with
) as the outcome; or (b) challenges and names a state θ such that f (θ ) = f (θ). If 2 challenges then 1 pays K to 2 and there begins a challenge procedure of up to T stages, as follows.
In stage t of the challenge procedure (t = 1, .., T ) player 1 either (i) sends no message, in which case the mechanism ends with outcome (a , 0, 0); or (ii) sends the message 'wait', in which case 2 pays k − to 1 and play moves to stage t + 1, unless t = T in which case the mechanism ends with outcome (a, −y, y).
If a player deviates from the above rules, he or she pays a large fine to the other player.
This completes the description of the mechanism. We refer to this mechanism, including the renegotiation stages, as M f (K, T, ). We show in the Appendix that in
(a) if the true state is θ, then in the subgame in which 1 has announced θ and 2 has just challenged with θ = θ, player 2's continuation payoff is
(b) if the true state is θ , then in the subgame in which 1 has announced θ = θ and 2 has just challenged with θ , player 2's continuation payoff is
The reasoning behind (a) is that if stage T is reached when the challenge was invalid, then 1 prefers to say 'wait', i.e., choose (a, −y, y), by (1). Of course, renegotiation takes place before she does so (after the previous message) in order to avoid the loss k associated with the message. By backward induction, if no renegotiation has taken place by stage t < T then 1 will say 'wait' there too. At the renegotiation which takes place immediately after the challenge, the cumulative gain, T k, from not going down this path is shared equally between the players. Nevertheless, as expression (5) shows, 2 bears a substantial cost, Suppose θ is true and 1 has told the truth (announced θ). If 2 does not challenge 2 gets
while, by (5), if he challenges he gets
which, by (2), (3) and (4), is strictly less. This shows that, once 1 has announced the true state, 2 cannot profitably challenge.
Now suppose that θ is true but 1 has announced θ. If 2 does not challenge, he
while, by (6), if he challenges he gets
which is strictly greater by (2). This shows that 2 will always challenge a false announcement by 1.
Now consider 1's choice of announcement at the start. Suppose that the true state is θ . If 1 announces θ then her payoff is
since 2 will not challenge. If she announces θ = θ then 2 will challenge. If he challenges with θ then player 2's payoff will be given by (7). Since the total surplus available is σ(θ ), 1's payoff if she announces θ is therefore bounded above by
which is less than the expression in (8) by (2). This shows that in any SPE player 1 tells the truth.
Thus, the unique SPE outcome in state θ, starting from the first announcement stage, is that 1 announces θ, incurring cost k, 2 does not challenge, there is no renegotiation and the final outcome, net of the message cost, is (a * (θ), y
Therefore, once θ is realized, the players renegotiate (before playing the mechanism)
to split the surplus of k, giving outcome (a *
. This proves the Theorem.
Discussion
Some continuation equilibria of the mechanism used here are inefficient. For example, at some nodes a player has to decide whether or not to send a message, and in some circumstances his equilibrium strategy is to do so. Since the message is costly, such a continuation is inefficient. A strong version of renegotiation-proofness (one which is common in the literature) would rule this out, the assumption being that somehow the players would renegotiate out of such a continuation. However, the mechanism above specifies that there are specific dates at which a message must be sent in order to avoid a particular consequence. If that date is reached and no renegotiation has yet happened (and any non-cooperative model of the renegotiation process would have to allow for that possibility, if renegotiation is voluntary), then it is too late to renegotiate. The relevant player must take whatever action is optimal for himself at that point. Of course, in equilibrium the players anticipate this inefficient outcome and renegotiate beforehand in order to avoid it.
The mechanism M f (K, T, ) (like many similar mechanisms found in the implementation literature) could be criticized on the grounds that it asks a player to describe the state θ, which might be very costly. On the other hand, in equilibrium the state is not actually described because renegotiation takes place beforehand in order to save on the costs of doing so. Even if describing the entire state is infeasible, for many models it would suffice to have a mechanism in which a small subset of the information contained in the state is described. For example, for the buyer-seller models in the literature, one would only need to describe the name of the efficient action (good) and the utility pair associated with it. In that case the challenge procedure would have to involve the option of making a counter-challenge in which a different action is claimed to be efficient. For discussion of this issue, see Maskin and Tirole (1999) .
The contract used in this paper, like many of those encountered in the implementation literature, is relatively complicated. For an analysis of a simple and robust contract which can achieve efficiency in holdup models, even when the environment is complex, see Evans (2008) . In that paper, however, unlike the current one, the argument requires an infinite horizon.
If the action space A depends on the state θ then the result will still obtain. In that case the mechanism would specify that after 1 has announced θ, 2 can, in addition to challenging the reported utilities, challenge the implied report about which actions are feasible. That is, 2 can exhibit an action which is infeasible though 1 has reported that it is feasible, or vice versa. By the usual assumptions, such statements are directly verifiable by the outside enforcer, and 2 can be rewarded for a valid challenge.
Stronger Notions of Renegotiation-Proofness
The definition of renegotiation-proofness employed in the preceding sections, following Maskin and Moore (1999) , assumes that after the mechanism is completed renegotiation takes place according to a rule which is known in advance. An alternative view, advanced by Neeman and Pavlov (2007) , is that the mechanism designer expects that renegotiation will take place but does not know what form it will take and so has to design the mechanism in such a way that it is robust to all possible forms of renegotiation. In this section we examine whether message costs can resolve the renegotiation problem when posed in this stronger form.
Definition Given θ, a Nash equilibrium (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of a mechanism is ex-postrenegotiation-proof if, for i = 1, 2, there does not exist a strategy σ i and outcome (a , y 1 , y 2 ) such that (i) (a , y 1 , y 2 ) Pareto-dominates the outcome of (σ i , σ −i ) and (ii) u i (a , θ) + y i > u i (a, θ) + y i , where (a, y 1 , y 2 ) is the outcome of (σ 1 , σ 2 ).
The idea of this concept, due to Neeman and Pavlov, is that a mechanism should not be regarded as robust against renegotiation if, for some player, there exists a deviation plus a Pareto-improving switch from the resulting outcome which together make the deviating player better off. To put it another way, we suppose that each player believes that he or she can make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer.
Definition A SCR f is ex-post-renegotiation-proof-implementable with message costs if, for any k > 0, there exists a k-mechanism such that, for each θ, there exists an ex-post renegotiation-proof subgame-perfect equilibrium σ θ of the mechanism and any such equilibrium has outcome f (θ).
Assumption 2:
Given θ, θ ∈ Θ such that f (θ) = f (θ ), there exist an agent i ∈ {1, 2} (the 'test agent') and a pair of feasible outcomes (a, y 1 , y 2 ) and (a , y 1 , y 2 ) such that
and
Theorem 2: Any bounded, Pareto-efficient social choice function which satisfies Assumption 2 is ex-post-renegotiation-proof-implementable with message costs.
Proof: Take the following mechanism. Each agent simultaneously announces a state (assume for simplicity that these messages are not costly). If they both announce the same state θ then the outcome is f (θ). Suppose that they announce different states (θ, θ ). They then play a version of the challenge procedure in the mechanism of the previous section. Suppose the test agent is 1 (who has announced θ). Then 1 pays K to the other agent and then repeatedly chooses between 'no message', which gives immediate outcome (a , y 1 , y 2 ), and 'wait', which eventually gives (a, y 1 , y 2 ). K is large compared to the maximum total surplus, and T k is large compared to K. The non-test-agent pays k to the test agent each time he sends a message. If the test agent for (θ, θ ) is 2, then the two outcomes are interchanged in the challenge procedure.
Suppose the true state is θ. There is a SPE in which they announce (θ, θ). Consider a unilateral deviation to θ . If the deviator is the test agent then he will have to pay K. If not, he will have to pay the message costs T k. In either case the deviation is not worthwhile.
The announcement pair (θ, θ ) cannot be part of a SPE. Player 2 should deviate to θ: she saves K if she is the test agent for (θ, θ ) and saves message costs if not.
The announcement pair (θ , θ ) cannot be part of a SPE either. The non-test-agent for (θ, θ ) should deviate to θ: she gets K and then the game finishes.
The unique SPE outcome is therefore f (θ). The equilibrium satisfies ex-post renegotiation-proofness because the penalty from deviating to θ outweighs any possible gain from renegotiating at the end of the game. QED.
In an ex-post-renegotiation-proof equilibrium, renegotiation can only take place after the play of the mechanism. However, if the mechanism is played over a number of periods, we should also allow for the possibility of renegotiation taking place during the course of the play of the mechanism. Suppose that when playing the mechanism used in the proof of Theorem 2, player 2 deviates by announcing θ when the true state is θ, and 1 is the test agent for (θ, θ ). Then 2 receives K but has to pay all the message costs, so the deviation is not worthwhile. Suppose, however, that 2 can renegotiate immediately after her announcement, taking all the surplus. Her payoff is then K + σ(θ) − u 1 (a, θ) − y 1 , so in this case the deviation is worthwhile. This motivates the following.
Given an extensive-form mechanism M , a state θ, a singleton node h of the mechanism, and a strategy pair (σ 1 , σ 2 ), let player i's expected payoff at h, given that this strategy pair will be played in the continuation, be denoted by u i (σ 1 , σ 2 , h, θ), and let the costs (e.g. message costs) incurred up to node h be z(h), so that the total payoff available if renegotiation takes place at this point is σ(θ) − z(h).
Given η ∈ (0, 1), let
anism which is the same as M except that node h is a terminal node at which i's h, θ, η) . This is the payoff which i expects to get if she deviates to σ i and expects then to renegotiate at node h, getting a (1 − η) share of the surplus.
Definition Given θ and η ∈ (0, 1), a subgame-perfect equilibrium (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of a mechanism is η-renegotiation-proof if, for i = 1, 2, there does not exist a strategy
where
Definition A SCR f is strongly renegotiation-proof-implementable in SPE with message costs if, for any k > 0 and any η > 0 there exists a k-mechanism such that, for each θ, there exists an η-renegotiation-proof subgame-perfect equilibrium σ θ of the mechanism and any such mechanism has outcome f (θ).
As the next Theorem shows, as long as η is strictly positive, (so that each player may expect, at a point of her choosing, to get almost all, but not all, of the renegotiation surplus) it is possible to implement under the same conditions as in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: Any bounded, Pareto-efficient social choice function which satisfies Assumption 2 is strongly renegotiation-proof-implementable in SPE with message costs.
Proof: Consider a mechanism which is the same as the one in the proof of Theorem 2 except that T is chosen so that T kη is large compared with K. As before, there is a unique SPE and, in this SPE, both announce the true state.
Let θ be the true state and consider a deviation by 2 to θ . There are two cases:
(i) 1 is the test agent for (θ, θ ); and (ii) 2 is the test agent for (θ, θ ). In case (i), the continuation payoffs, in the absence of renegotiation, at the start of the challenge procedure, are
for 1, and
for 2, since 1 will always choose 'wait'. If 2 renegotiates and gets (1 − η) share of the surplus, her payoff will be
which means that the deviation is not profitable.
In case (ii), the continuation payoffs are
for 1 and
for 2, which, after renegotiation, gives 2
Again, the deviation is not profitable. The argument for a deviation by 1 is similar.
QED.
Incomplete Information
Now suppose that each player is uninformed about the type of the other player.
The set of states of the world Θ is given by Θ = Θ 1 × Θ 2 , where Θ i is player i's type space, assumed finite. Each player knows her own type and has a probability distribution over the other player's type space which is derived via Bayes' rule from a common prior over Θ. We make the assumption of private values: for each i and
There are many possible ways to model renegotiation-proofness in this context.
One possibility (see Neeman and Pavlov (2007) ) is to suppose that after the players have announced their types and the outcome of the mechanism has been revealed to them, a third party proposes an alternative outcome and each player then votes on whether to overturn the mechanism's outcome in favour of the alternative. If all do so, the alternative is implemented. An equilibrium of a mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against all such alternative proposals.
In practice, the renegotiation proposal would have to be made by one of the parties to the contract. Furthermore, the proposal itself may reveal something about the type of the player making the proposal. This consideration will not be relevant in the private values case if the responder merely has to choose between the final outcome of the mechanism (a, y 1 , y 2 ) and a renegotiation proposal (a , y 1 , y 2 ), i.e. if, at the time of renegotiation, the play of the mechanism is already completed. However, an alternative point of view is that the mechanism might be designed in such a way that its play is not definitively completed until the outcome (which may involve private and/or public actions) is actually executed. This would imply that if a renegotiation offer is made by one party (necessarily before execution of the outcome), the other party could then activate some provision of the mechanism. In that case the fact that the responder could make an inference from the renegotiation offer might well be relevant.
In order to model this possibility, we proceed as follows.
A mechanism M is a continuous-time extensive game form. At time 0 each player publicly announces her type. An outcome function g : Θ → A × × specifies, for any pair of announcements (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) ∈ Θ, an outcome (a(θ 1 ,θ 2 ), y 1 (θ 1 ,θ 2 ), y 2 (θ 1 ,θ 2 )).
If, at timet > 0, no further moves have been made then this outcome is executed.
The mechanism may also specify other moves which the players may take beforet, which may lead to different outcomes.
As in Section 2, we extend the mechanism to incorporate renegotiation moves.
The above describes the underlying extensive-form game. In addition, either player can trigger a bargaining stage at any time between 0 andt. This means that, with probability 1 − η (where η > 0), the player who triggers the bargaining is able to make an offer (ã,ỹ 1 ,ỹ 2 ) and the other player immediately accepts or rejects it. With probability η there is no offer. If the offer is accepted then (ã,ỹ 1 ,ỹ 2 ) is implemented;
otherwise, the remainder of the mechanism is played out. Since we want to allow for secret, non-verifiable renegotiation offers, the specification of the underlying game after rejection of a renegotiation offer is the same as if the offer did not happen. A player can trigger at most one bargaining stage, and after a renegotiation offer is made there are no more bargaining stages for either player
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. The role of the continuous-time formulation is twofold. Firstly it allows us to treat the two players symmetrically:
in effect, if η is small, each player believes that she can make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer after the announcements are made. Secondly, it means that there is no final period before execution of the contract at which (i) renegotiation can take place but (ii) no more moves in the mechanism can be made. This seems natural:
presumably if there is time to agree on a new contract then there is time, for example, to trigger a challenge procedure.
The set of extended mechanisms defined in this way, given η > 0 and given that messages cost (up to) k > 0, is denoted byM (k, η).
Since we have freedom to set out-of-equilibrium beliefs, it is possible to construct equilibria in which neither player ever makes a renegotiation offer because the responder would then form a belief about the proposer's type which would in turn make it optimal to reject the offer and subsequently heavily punish the proposer. In order to rule out implausible beliefs, we restrict them as follows.
Given a strategy profile σ, a history h, and a type θ i of player i, let v i (σ, h, θ i ) be i's continuation payoff (net of any costs already incurred) at h if she has type θ i and σ is played in the continuation. Let H(i, σ) be the set of histories such that σ specifies that i does not propose a renegotiation at h, for any type of i to which j attaches strictly positive probability at this history. Let z = (a , y 1 , y 2 ) be a renegotiation proposal and let
be the set of types who would strictly prefer to make the proposal z at h if the responder were expected to accept it.
A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (σ, µ) (where µ is the system of beliefs) of an 5 If the two players simultaneously make renegotiation offers, we assume they are both ignored.
extended mechanism inM (k, η) is said to be renegotiation-monotonic if, for any i, any history h ∈ H(i, σ), any renegotiation proposal z by i and any θ i ∈ A i (z , h, σ) , the probability attached to θ i by j's belief weakly increases as a result of the renegotiation offer.
A SCR f is then said to be renegotiation-proof-implementable in Perfect Bayesian equilibrium with message costs if, for any k > 0 and any η > 0, there exists a mechanism inM (k, η) and a renegotiation-monotonic PBE (σ, µ) of this mechanism such that, for all θ ∈ Θ, the outcome of the equilibrium is f (θ).
Note that, unlike those in the previous sections, this is a weak notion of implementation. It is similar to the idea in the previous section of strong renegotiation-proofimplementability in SPE in that we effectively suppose that each player imagines that she can lie about her type and then subsequently, at a time of her choosing,
renegotiate and obtain essentially all the renegotiation surplus. The restriction on beliefs implies that if, for example, a player (i) initially believes that the other player (j) told the truth, and j then proposes a renegotiation which would benefit j had he indeed told the truth, then i must continue to believe that j told the truth. The proof is in the Appendix. The idea of the proof is as follows. After the announcements (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) =θ have been made, f (θ) is implemented att unless a challenge has been made. A challenge involves naming an outcome (a, y 1 , y 2 ) which the other would find strictly worse than f (θ) if he has told the truth, and then proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 1, with the challenger paying all the message costs (so if the challenged party actually prefers (a, y 1 , y 2 ) then the challenger gets paid K whereas if the challenged party told the truth the challenge, in the absence of renegotiation, goes to the end and the challenger has to pay a large bill.
In the equilibrium, each party tells the truth and each believes that the other told the truth unless the other proposes a renegotiation which would benefit the responder but would only benefit the proposer if he had lied at the outset, in which case she now believes that he is one such type. In that event the responder rejects the proposal and challenges, with an outcome which she believes the other would prefer to f (θ). This implies that it is not possible to benefit by lying and then proposing a renegotiation.
Since there will be no renegotiation, interim incentive-compatibility implies that it is optimal to tell the truth.
message cost) will be
so she prefers to say 'wait' if
From (4) and Assumption 1, this is satisfied, so 1 chooses to wait. Therefore there is a unique SPE continuation and 1's continuation payoff at (or just before) the stage-T choice is made is given by (13) while player 2's is
Now suppose, as an induction hypothesis, that just before the decision at stage t (t = 2, ..., T ), when no renegotiation has taken place so far, there is a unique SPE continuation, 1's continuation payoff is
and 2's is
This is true for t = T by (13) and (15). Expressions (16) and (17) sum to σ(θ) − k so there is a renegotiation surplus of k after the message 'wait' has been sent at stage t−1, which will be equally split. Thus, at stage t−1, 1 chooses between 'no message', giving the payoff in expression (12), and 'wait', which gives her
since she has to bear cost if she waits. Thus, she prefers 'wait' if d(a, a , θ) > 2y + 2 − (k − 2 )(T − (t − 1)) which is true by (14); hence, in the unique SPE continuation, 1's payoff at stage t − 1 is given by (18) and 2's is
which proves the induction hypothesis. Therefore, (using (17) with t = 1) once 2 has challenged, his continuation payoff in the unique SPE continuation, including the payment K and adding k 2
for the renegotiation which takes place immediately after the challenge, is
(b) Consider a subgame in which 1 has announced θ, 2 has challenged with θ , but the true state is θ , so the challenge is valid.
By the logic leading to (14), at stage T of the challenge procedure 1 strictly prefers to send no message if 2y + 2 > d(a, a , θ ), which is true by (4) and Assumption 1. Suppose that at stage t > 1 player 1 strictly prefers to send no message. This continuation being efficient (allowing for the renegotiation from outcome (a , 0, 0)), there is no renegotiation after the message 'wait' at stage t − 1, so 1 chooses at stage t − 1 between (i) pre-renegotiation outcome (a , 0, 0) now or (ii) the same outcome at the following stage, less cost . Clearly the former is better. Therefore, by backward induction, the unique equilibrium payoff for 2 if he challenges with θ is The beliefs in (c) are consistent with equilibrium because in equilibrium the other player will not make a renegotiation offer. They are also consistent with the renegotiation-monotonicity property. This is because, since f is ex-post efficient, for a renegotiation offer by 2 which 1 strictly prefers to the default outcome,θ 2 does not belong to A 2 (z , h, σ), i.e. it is acceptable to believe that 2 did not tell the truth.
If there has been no challenge and 2 has not made a renegotiation offer as in (k), then it is optimal for 1 not to challenge. She believes that 2 told the truth, hence that the challenge procedure will go to the end in the absence of renegotiation. Even if she immediately makes a renegotiation offer, there is probability η that she will bear the message costs, so the challenge is not profitable.
It remains to show that a player cannot profitably make a renegotiation proposal if there has been no challenge. Proposals of the type in (i) and (j) clearly cannot help. Regardless of whether player 1 has told the truth then a proposal as described in (k) (with player numbers interchanged -the strategies are symmetric) cannot be profitable because 2 will reject and challenge and 1 will then have to pay K.
Finally, since there will be no renegotiation whether the players tell the truth or not, it is optimal for each to tell the truth by interim incentive-compatibility.
QED
